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Abstract  
In this paper I argue that the value attributed to coral reefs drives the characterisation of evidence 
for their regeneration or degradation. I observe that regeneration and degradation depend on an 
understanding of what an ecosystem looks like when undegraded (a baseline), and that many 
mutually exclusive baselines can be given for any single case. Consequently, facts about ecological 
processes are insufficient to usefully and non-arbitrarily characterise changes to ecosystems. By 
examining how baselines and the value of reefs interact in coral and algal reef examples, I argue that 
considering the value of an ecosystem is a necessity when describing processes like regeneration 
and degradation. This connects value as studied in socio-ecological and economic research with 
values as discussed in the philosophy of science literature. It also explains why such a broad range of 
processes may be considered regenerative, including those which introduce significant novelty, as 
well as pointing towards ways to mediate related debates, such as those surrounding novel and 
‘pristine’ ecosystems. 
Keywords coral reef, regeneration, degradation, value, ecosystem, baselines 
1. Introduction 
Coral reefs are increasingly threatened ecosystems. Both degradation and attempts at regeneration 
are pushing them into never-before-seen (novel) ecological configurations (Hughes et al., 2017) 
(Graham et al., 2014). The status of such configurations may be unclear or disputed (e.g. Tye Pettay 
et al., 2015; Stat and Gates, 2011). In theory, changes which restore aspects of the reef system, such 
as its functioning or structure, are regenerative (MacCord and Maienschein, 2019). Conversely, 
changes which impede such aspects are considered degradation or damage2 (Vásquez-Grandón, 
Donoso and Gerding, 2018). In practice, this distinction is not clear-cut, leading to debates over the 
status of ecosystems or the desirability of interventions to alter them (Hobbs, Higgs and Harris, 
2009; Graham et al., 2014; Filbee-Dexter and Smajdor, 2019; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2008). Part of 
the problem is that descriptions must be relative to a baseline, i.e. a depiction of the undegraded 
state of the ecosystem in question. What a baseline contains has been left largely implicit 
(something I aim to remedy here), but is hugely consequential: using different baselines will produce 
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different answers as to whether a change is regenerative, degradative, or neither (Soga and Gaston, 
2018; Ureta, Lekan and von Hardenberg, 2020). As I show in what follows, these answers may differ 
drastically, producing mutually exclusive characterisations of the state of an ecosystem. 
In this paper I address the problem of how regeneration is distinguished from degradation in 
practice, using the case of algal and coral reefs. I argue that there is nothing factual that prevents 
algal reefs being seen as non-degraded, or, conversely, coral-dominated reefs as degraded. To make 
the terms regeneration and degradation useful and non-arbitrary, they must be relative to aspects 
of reefs that are considered to be valuable. Whilst this invites charges of pernicious relativism, i.e. 
that all assessments of degradation and regeneration are therefore as good as each other, I argue 
that value actually prevents such an outcome. As such, value is a necessary part of these concepts. 
This shows an important and under-appreciated role for this sense of value in coral reef science and 
in philosophy of science/ecology generally (as well as a role for the social sciences in understanding 
and articulating such value attributions). It also helps address a problem faced by any general 
account of regeneration, namely by explaining what unifies the broad range of processes the label 
has been applied to, or else explaining why some of these cases are not really cases of regeneration. 
This is particularly challenging as some processes described as regenerative involve introduction of 
significant novelty, which seems at odds with the notion of regeneration as a recursive process. 
Another challenge is to account for the disagreements, seen throughout the history of regeneration 
studies, over what counts as a regenerative process3. The account I offer here can do this. It also 
pushes us to further recognise the necessity of taking a perspective in some areas of science, and 
suggests avenues for mediating disputes across some of these perspectives. 
As regeneration is related both to health (i.e. how a system ought to behave or function) and to self-
renewal (i.e. persistence and restoration) I build on accounts developed by philosophers in these 
areas. Philosophical analyses of cell self-renewal have suggested that it be distinguished from other 
processes by looking for the persistence of some contextually defined set of characteristics across 
cell division (Fagan, 2013, pp.20–22). If these persist, and no significant deviations in cell 
characteristics are detected, the cell can be described as undergoing self-renewal. In attempts to 
define disease, accounts which treat it as statistical difference in characteristics across a class of 
organisms must limit which reference classes of organisms to include in the comparison. Comparing 
the pulse of a young organism to an old one may erroneously cast one of them as ill, for example. 
Reference classes will typically account for all sorts of variation in characteristics depending on the 
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context (Kingma, 2007, 2020). Both of these accounts stress that context, interests, and values shape 
the concepts we use. I build on this by developing an account which links pre-existent 
understandings of coral reef value to philosophical discussion about the role of values in science. 
Unlike the cases above, this account applies to reefs as ecosystems, rather than organisms or cells. 
That there are similarities across cellular biology, medical biology and ecology also suggests that the 
role for value outlined here may apply in cases of regeneration at different scales, thereby 
potentially forming part of an account of regeneration across living systems generally4 (MacCord and 
Maienschein, 2019). 
I first look at the literature on values in science and the distinctive aspects of the coral case explored 
here. After this, I outline what an ecological baseline consists of, and use baselines to give definitions 
of regeneration and degradation. Different baselines will yield different descriptions of regeneration 
and degradation. Next, I examine the case of algal dominance, which is a textbook example of coral 
reef degradation. Even here, multiple distinct baselines can be employed, so algal takeovers labelled 
as degradation or regeneration. This threatens to make the application of the labels arbitrary, if only 
considering the facts of each case. It also crystalizes the problem: why are certain baselines 
employed in algal domination cases, leading to these cases being considered as degradation? To 
solve this, I look at what goes into the baselines employed in the algal domination case, and why. 
Value plays an important role here, driving the inclusion of some things (and some kinds of thing) 
and not others into baselines, with descriptions of degradation and regeneration thereby partly 
contingent upon the value attributed to reefs, i.e. not purely factual. This explains why algal 
domination is typically considered degradation, but also why there is disagreement over this. It also 
helps explain the prevalence of notions of purely factual baselines in coral science despite 
simultaneous recognition of the comparatively great value accorded to baseline states. Here, the 
value of certain coral reef assemblages serves as a justification for employing specific baselines, 
thereby ensuring regeneration and degradation are useful and non-arbitrary labels. 
I then explore the merits and implications of this account, arguing it forces us to recognise the 
importance of perspective in this area of science, explains the inclusion of a broad range of 
processes under the label regeneration, including those which introduce novelty, and also allows for 
the disagreement and shifts seen historically in what processes are considered regenerative. It 
further explains some of the virtues and vices of the ecosystem service and novel ecosystem 
 
4 There are also important differences between regeneration as discussed here and illness/self-renewal of 
cells: ecosystems are more obviously shared and public systems, so have a larger set of stakeholders to 
consider; regeneration is not limited to function in the way talk about illness often is; the values involved here 
are of a different type to those typically discussed in other contexts (see next section); amongst other 
differences. For brevity’s sake I do not further examine the differences and similarities here.  




approaches to ecology, as well as how future-oriented baselines are possible. Finally, I highlight 
some avenues for mediation between different perspectives on regeneration that this account 
suggests. 
2. Values in coral science   
That science is influenced by values is, by now, a well-trodden path, albeit more by philosophers 
than scientists. Science-value interactions come in many forms, starting with more seminal notions 
of underdetermination of theories by evidence (Quine, 1951; Putnam, 2002; Stanford, 2017) and the 
role of epistemic values such as simplicity in theory choice (Kuhn, 1977)5. Since then, more cases of 
epistemic and non-epistemic values influencing both external and internal aspects of science have 
emerged, such as when evaluating the risks of accepting or rejecting hypotheses (Douglas, 2016) or 
when making choices about the construction and application of concepts (Dupré, 2007). Other 
developments include challenges to the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction (Rooney, 1992), and 
accounts which show value influencing scientific practices as well as concepts (Lee and Helgesson, 
2020). More exotic ways of relating value to science have also been explored, such as treating the 
scientific laboratory as a site of production of various forms of value (Pinel, 2020). 
There is an interesting change visible when shifting from values in science to science as producing 
forms of value: from values to value (or forms of value). Whilst this may be partly linguistic (these 
are of course related notions), much of the discussion of value in science has been about values as 
influencing the content and practices of science. Typically this involves ideals of sorts: simplicity, 
fruitfulness, accuracy, universality on one hand; personal, ethical and social values on the other 
(Douglas, 2016; Rooney, 1992; Elliott and McKaughan, 2014). Value, in contrast, is more often 
attributed to entities or processes, and as such the immense cultural, economic and ecological value 
attributed to coral reefs. 
The coral case nicely brings out a role for this sort of value in science. In coral science, the traditional 
philosophical path of value-ladenness is less well-trodden. For example, concepts such as the 
baseline state of a coral reef (explored in the next section) are often presented as simply given by 
nature. Disputes about baselines seem to revolve around factual questions, such as whether the 
correct timescale has been picked to represent a ‘pristine’ coral reef, i.e. whether the baselines 
employed have shifted from the true baseline (Jackson, 2001; Bruno et al., 2014). Despite this, coral 
scientists frequently make appeals to the many and varied valuable facets of coral reefs, for example 
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consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness (Douglas, 2016). Non-epistemic values are any other form of value, 
typically values described as ethical, social, personal or religious. 




comparing them in value to rainforests, stressing the many ways humans and other organisms 
depend on them, and describing the goal of coral reef management as sustaining coral reef 
contributions to human wellbeing (rather than simply returning reefs to their baseline states) 
(Knowlton, 2001; NASEM, 2019, p.1; Bellwood et al., 2004).  
On the one hand, then, coral reefs are bearers of immense value. On the other, what a reef ought to 
look like is treated as a factual matter. I intend to square these two with one another, offering an 
account of the role of value in influencing scientific concepts and practice. Here, the value attributed 
to aspects of the object of study itself (the coral reef) drives concept formation in coral science, 
shaping how evidence is characterised, and so how things are described and responded to (via 
baselines and the labels regeneration and degradation). This is because descriptions of changes to 
coral systems are underdetermined by the facts, so value must be employed to adjudicate between 
descriptions6. In this case, these forms of value are non-epistemic: ecological or economic, affective 
or aesthetic, for example. They are more often applied to particular entities, as in accounts of the 
laboratory as a site of value production (Pinel, 2020). They aren’t the typical kinds of non-epistemic 
value discussed in more traditional philosophy of science contexts, which are often instead spoken 
of in terms of social, political or personal values (Rooney, 1992; Elliott and McKaughan, 2014). Nor is 
value here influencing science purely through consideration of downstream risk (as in Douglas 
(2000)). There is, of course, likely overlap between value in the sense employed here, and values as 
regards discussion of non-epistemic values influencing science, for example in the role of aesthetic 
values guiding science and the aesthetic value of coral reefs7. Equally, this kind of role for non-
epistemic values generally has been articulated before (e.g. in connection with the multiple goals of 
science (Elliott and McKaughan, 2014)). However, I hope here to draw more direct connections 
between these senses of value: value as studied in areas like ecology, economics, and anthropology, 
and as attributed to entities in the world; and values as influencing science.  
There is also a large literature on value in ecology and conservation, including recognition of the 
essentially normative nature of conservation, such as its commitment to the value of biodiversity 
(Soulé, 1985). Relatedly, there have been discussions about the role of concepts like biodiversity as 
meeting places for value and scientific judgment (Sarkar, 2019). Values are also often noted as 
operating in areas such as health and wellbeing (Kingma, 2007; Alexandrova, 2018)8, resulting in 
concepts and claims in these areas being considered ‘thick’ or ‘mixed’ (Putnam, 2002; Alexandrova, 
 
6 This is, in part, because the systems in question are environments for various agents, human and non-human, 
(some of) whose interests we have to consider.  
7 I do not explore this overlap any further here  
8 Although even here a role for value is sometimes still denied, such as in purely naturalist accounts of disease 
(Powell and Scarffe, 2019) 




2018). As such, it will not be surprising to philosophers versed in these areas that regeneration and 
degradation too are value-laden. What will hopefully be of interest here is an account of how they 
are value-laden, one which draws connections to the value of the object of study itself (coral reefs in 
coral science). It has previously been suggested that non-epistemic value should not directly 
influence the characterisation and interpretation of evidence (e.g. Douglas, 2016); and that 
attributing value to the objects of study of ecology (such as specific organisms, species, functions or 
structures) can have a pernicious influence on ecological science, subtly skewing results and how 
they are presented (Vellend, 2019). Whilst I do not deny this may sometimes be the case, I argue 
here that some value attributions are also necessary for concepts like regeneration and degradation 
to be useful and non-arbitrary. I also hope that the arguments here will help clarify debates around 
baseline choice in coral science, showing that aiming for pristine reefs is justifiable, but not on purely 
factual grounds.  
3. Regeneration, degradation, and baselines  
As we have seen already, distinguishing regeneration from degradation requires looking for 
restoration or impediment of some aspect of the system in question (MacCord and Maienschein, 
2019; Vásquez-Grandón, Donoso and Gerding, 2018). To determine if aspects of a system have been 
impeded or restored, a reference point is required. This point allows for comparison, by describing 
how the system in question ought to behave, that is, what characteristics it ought to have. 
Restoration or impediment is then judged relative to this reference point.  
Such a reference point is sometimes called a baseline (Vásquez-Grandón, Donoso and Gerding, 2018; 
Campbell et al., 2009; Jackson, 2001). They are based, at least in part, on the historical or present 
behaviour of either the specific system in question, or systems of that type (Vásquez-Grandón, 
Donoso and Gerding, 2018; Braverman, 2020). Regeneration then becomes the movement of some 
system towards its baseline, i.e. movement towards how it ought to behave. This is re-generative, 
rather than simply generative, because the system is thought to either have actually exhibited those 
characteristics in the past, or to be the type of system which exhibits such characteristics. 
Degradation is the opposite: movement from a baseline, i.e. from how the system ought to behave 
(Hobbs, 2016).  
Baselines need to be indexed to a timescale, as time greatly alters the significance of events within 
ecosystems. What impedes aspects of a system on one timescale may restore aspects of it on 
another (and vice versa). A classic example is forest fire, which may kill many organisms on a short 
timescale, but be a vital part of regenerating habitats on a longer one (Johnstone et al., 2016). Not 




only this, but baselines must focus on a specific set of entities and characteristics, as ecosystems 
have many aspects to consider: compositions, functions, and structures among the most commonly 
mentioned (Hobbs, Higgs and Harris, 2009; Vásquez-Grandón, Donoso and Gerding, 2018)9. Not all 
of these will be included in regeneration or degradation claims, and indeed there may be some 
aspects of ecosystems which it is difficult to restore or prioritise simultaneously, such as predator 
and prey populations, or populations of organisms occupying similar niches. That there are multiple 
non-linear paths to degradation and regeneration (and implicitly that there are multiple possible 
baselines) is sometimes recognised in the coral regeneration literature (Rinkevich, 2005; Woodhead 
et al., 2019). 
So, changes to a reef can be described in relation to the elements of the employed baseline. What 
exactly does a baseline consist of? This has often been left largely implicit. Using coral systems as an 
example, we can say that a baseline must consist of: (1) a desirable reef state (or dynamic set of 
states); (2) a set of measurable reef characteristics (or proxies for these) which are taken to 
correspond to that state; and (3) a spatiotemporal scale. Characteristics may include things like 
structure, function and composition. Regeneration is the movement of the characteristics of the 
system towards those depicted in the baseline state. As we see later, which sorts of characteristics 
are included will make a big difference to how changes are characterised. Note that baselines, in 
order to reflect ecosystems, may often need to be dynamic - i.e. depicting a range of some variables, 
or a cycle/pathway - rather than ‘states’ in a strict static sense (Vásquez-Grandón, Donoso and 
Gerding, 2018; Ureta, Lekan and von Hardenberg, 2020)10.  
Several factors complicate this picture. How can we ensure we have a good baseline? More broadly, 
how can we decide how a living system, especially an ecosystem, ought to behave? One view is that 
baselines are given by nature: we must look for e.g. the objective proper functions of coral 
ecosystems, or how they behaved before significant human disturbances11. This provides the 
baseline (Campbell et al., 2009; Jackson, 2001). Problems arise however, in that people often employ 
different baselines in the same cases, such as in the infamous ‘shifting baseline syndrome’. In this 
case, younger observers see ecosystems as less degraded than their older counterparts, having only 
 
9 Baselines will also be indexed to a spatial scale, although I assume here that specifying entities and 
characteristics will do this sufficiently.  
10 This is to say that returning to a baseline may be a homeorhetic, rather than homeostatic, process (see 
Fabris, 2018). 
11The view of nature as undisturbed before the arrival of humans may often have deep theological roots 
(Robbins and Moore, 2013) (with thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out). The idea of a 
singular pre-human-disturbance baseline, and that this is necessarily the most desirable or natural state for an 
ecosystem to exist in, is problematic, something I return to later. See Cronon (1996) for more on this. 




experienced more heavily degraded ecosystems12 (Braverman, 2020; Pauly, 1995). (Often, in the 
literature, the observers mentioned are scientists, although this applies to any kind of observer13.) 
This hints at a broader problem: what gets included in a specific baseline may vary, given the huge 
range of entities, characteristics and timescales available for the observer when describing the 
system. As a result, it has been argued that baselines are contingent and constructed, so different 
observers in different contexts will not include the same things in their baselines (Ureta, Lekan and 
von Hardenberg, 2020). From this a new problem emerges: if the distinction between degradation 
and regeneration is contingent upon the baseline, and if radically different baselines can be 
employed in a given case, the same process can be painted as regenerative, damaging or neither. As 
I show later, this is not simply ambiguity about the degree of degradation, because a focus on 
different timescales and characteristics can produce mutually exclusive descriptions. This makes the 
distinction between regeneration and degradation arbitrary when considering only the facts about a 
specific ecosystem. To avoid this there must be some reason to favour one baseline over another. I 
now turn to a textbook case of degradation, algal domination of reefs, and analyse how baselines 
are employed there.   
4. Algal domination and baselines 
Reef systems need not be coral reef systems. At its broadest, a reef is an underwater ridge, and need 
contain no coral or living things at all, being purely geological. Often, however, a variety of 
organisms produce and sustain reefs, usually in concert with one another, including algae, sponges, 
corals and, in the case of regeneration strategies, humans (Sheppard et al., 2017). These organisms 
may be of vastly different types: whilst coral are Cnidarian animals which exist as polyps and 
colonies (and are cousins with jellyfish, hydra and anemones), algae are a disparate group of 
acellular, unicellular and multicellular organisms which lack true organs, generally use light energy to 
create food, and cause headaches for taxonomists (Sheppard et al., 2017; Vroom et al., 2006). When 
reefs are mentioned, it is typically in the context of coral reefs, i.e. reefs which corals play a 
significant role in building. Coral reefs are produced through collaboration between many organisms. 
Algae are one notable set of such organisms, playing important symbiotic roles which are essential 
 
12 Note also that shifting baseline syndrome assumes such ecosystems really are more degraded, i.e. it takes 
some pre-existing baseline as given, with newer shifted baselines being incorrect (Pauly, 1995). There is an 
interesting parallel here with the phenomenon of adaptive preference in economics, whereby people who live 
in seemingly objectively impoverished conditions give surprisingly positive evaluations of their quality of life 
(Nussbaum, 2001, p.135). 
13 I focus here on scientists, but I do not mean to suggest that they necessarily have any privilege or authority 
when it comes to valuing reefs. Many other stakeholders are also important to consider. The question of 
whose values matter when is a very important one, and one which I do not have the space to do justice to 
here.  




for reef development, such as acting as a cement holding much of the rock together (Sheppard et al., 
2017). A typical coral-dominated reef will contain much algae as well as coral. Coral-dominated reefs 
are the charismatic colourful tourist attractions that most people usually think of when reefs are 
mentioned. The algae is usually kept in check by the grazing of symbiotic reef organisms like 
herbivorous fish14. Whilst corals are themselves animals, coral reefs are ecosystems, and it is the 
ecosystem which I refer to throughout this paper.  
Under some circumstances, the balance of coral and algae on the reef can be disrupted, shifting the 
configuration of the ecosystem. One possible set of outcomes is ecosystems dominated by algae. 
This process can also occur in either direction, with coral takeovers of algal-dominated reefs also 
possible, although less common (Graham et al., 2013). Algal-dominated reefs (algal reefs) are often a 
murky green, and support different combinations of organisms, having different ecosystem 
dynamics to coral-dominated ones (Vroom et al., 2006). It is worth noting here that the ecosystem 
dynamics of algal and coral reefs vary widely within these categories as well as between them 
(Fulton et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2014). The circumstances which cause algal takeovers of reefs 
vary. They can, for example, occur after coral bleaching, or after exposure to high levels of nutrients. 
Evidence suggests that in many places where anthropogenic stressors are higher, coral systems are 
more likely to become dominated by algae (Graham et al., 2013). Importantly however, algal reefs 
also occur independently of human influence, and represent one set of the many stable 
configurations reef systems can exist in (Vroom et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2013). This raises the 
question of why algal reefs are considered degraded.  
4.1 Algal reefs as degraded 
Algal domination is often treated as synonymous with degradation. Given its association with 
human-driven stress, algal dominance of reefs is often used as a measure of how degraded a coral 
reef ecosystem is, particularly given the (often) striking visual differences which make it a convenient 
metric for assessing degradation (Vroom et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2018). Much research has been 
conducted into how to reverse or prevent shifts to algal-dominated states, as well as the kinds of 
things which trigger them (Graham et al., 2013; Rachmilovitz and Rinkevich, 2017).  
 
14It is worth noting that the term coral-dominated is not well defined, and subject to debate. Algae often play a 
larger role in coral reef building than is commonly realised, and the distinction between coral and algal reefs is 
not a neat one, with many mixed states existing. I return to these points later. I use the term coral-dominated 
here to refer to reefs in which coral play a larger role in reef-building than in algal reefs. Some authors have 
suggested referring to any coral reef as a coralgal reef, although this has (perhaps unsurprisingly) not caught 
on (Vroom, 2011).  




Shifts to algal domination are often associated with the death of many organisms and loss of species, 
including coral themselves and various fish, although the exact impacts vary depending on the 
situation (Fulton et al., 2019; Bellwood et al., 2004). Key ecosystem functions (such as inorganic 
carbon accumulation, and associated reef-building/habitat provision) will be impeded in the process, 
and the biodiversity of the reef system is likely to drop considerably (McClanahan, 2002; Roth et al., 
2018; Rachmilovitz and Rinkevich, 2017). What was once a vibrant and diverse ecosystem may come 
to look murky, stagnant and lifeless (Bellwood et al., 2004). Furthermore ecosystem services, such as 
those supporting tourism, fish production or protection of coastlines against erosion, may be 
compromised (Woodhead et al., 2019).   
The baselines being employed here are typically motivated towards reversing the impacts of 
anthropogenic disturbances (Rachmilovitz and Rinkevich, 2017; Bellwood et al., 2004). This implies a 
timescale reaching back to before these disturbances, although there may still be considerable 
variation in how far back this should be. Descriptions of pre-human undegraded coral ecosystems 
typically stress a much higher abundance of large animals, both predators and herbivores, as well as 
higher coral cover of the reef, particularly by certain species of coral, such as long-lived coral which 
reproduce by mass spawning (Jackson, 2001). Pre-human-disturbance timescales may vary from the 
past few decades (when the impacts of human disturbances became more obvious) to those much 
further back, for example before fishing and other activities reduced the prevalence of many marine 
organisms associated with coral reefs (Campbell et al., 2009). Often more recent and acute 
disturbances are focused on, rather than more chronic long-term ones (Bellwood et al., 2004). It 
might still be argued however that the proper baseline, i.e. the one which reflects how coral 
ecosystems ought to behave, is whatever timescale excludes all human disturbance, i.e. represents a 
pristine reef system (Jackson, 2001).  
More important for our purposes are the entities and characteristics being focused on. Often, as is 
the case here, the baselines employed for characterising changes to reef systems are coral-
dominated ones. They may also be focused on specific coral species (Graham et al., 2014; Bruno et 
al., 2014). Movement away from this (including sometimes changes in the type of coral) is 
degradation. Indeed, some authors actually define shifts to non-coral systems as degradation 
(Graham et al., 2014, p.9).  The characteristics highlighted often include attributes such as high coral 
cover of the reef, high biodiversity and high structural complexity (Graham et al., 2013). They also 
include a mixture of ecosystem functions serving humans (or ‘ecosystem services’) and serving other 
organisms. Common examples are habitat provision for a range of fish (Bellwood et al., 2004), 
accretion of carbon into reefs (McClanahan, 2002), supporting flows of nutrients and energy 
(Moberg and Folke, 1999) and supporting fishing and tourism (Graham et al., 2013). Whilst it is often 




recognised that pristine reefs - i.e. reefs as they appeared before human disturbance - are 
impossible to return to, these can still be employed as a baseline which can be moved towards (i.e. 
partial regeneration) (Graham et al., 2013). 
In this case then, at first sight, it seems there is an obvious baseline to compare changes in algal 
composition of reefs to: a coral-dominated, biodiverse, pre-human-disturbance baseline which 
provides a variety of ecosystem functions to nearby organisms, including humans. This might seem 
to suggest that in obvious cases such as algal domination, baselines need not be constructed, and 
are simply read off of nature. Even here however, a series of choices have been made which led to 
algal reefs being labelled degraded.  
4.2 Alternative baselines 
A variety of other timescales and sets of entities and characteristics could be employed here, 
producing different baselines. These different baselines will alter how algal reefs are judged: are 
they degraded, and if so, how badly?  
With respect to timescales, longer ones may include reefs with compositions differing to those of 
modern reefs, even for those undisturbed by humans (Veron, 2008, p.72; Bruno et al., 2014). Shorter 
ones may allow for recent changes in characteristics such as species composition, as is the case with 
shifting baseline syndrome, or with the emergence of novel ecosystems15. They may also include 
human disturbances in the baseline (Jackson, 2001; Hobbs, Higgs and Harris, 2009). Further, the 
huge range of entities discernible, across both time and space, means that many different sets of 
entities could be focused on when constructing baselines. For example, algae or sea urchins, which 
can prosper in different ecological configurations to coral, could have been prioritised (Bellwood et 
al., 2004). 
Likewise, various sets of characteristics can be prioritised within baselines. Focusing on the 
composition, structure or function of an ecosystem will produce different baselines and so different 
characterisations of changes to ecosystems. Even within these sets of characteristics this is the case. 
One set of characteristics employed when characterising algal reefs is ecosystem functions. Algal 
reefs may be described as ecosystems with impeded functioning, and therefore as degraded (Done, 
1992). However, functions in ecosystems can be ascribed in a variety of ways and serve many 
possible purposes, goals, and actors16. Definitions of function in coral science may be as broad as 
 
15 Note that not all recent changes in composition will be clearly attributable to human disturbance, as with 
the case of Crown-of-Thorns starfish outbreaks (Sapp, 1999). 
16 Without delving too heavily into the vast literature on function in philosophy, the function of something is, 
roughly, what it does, or what it’s for (Laubichler et al., 2015). To survey these briefly, functions can be: the 
 




‘the movement or storage of energy or matter within ecosystems’ (Bellwood et al., 2019, p.950). The 
various ways of ascribing function to parts of ecosystems will allow for the same changes to an 
ecosystem to be described in very different functional terms. Many of the functions in an ecosystem 
may also be incompatible. For example, some algal formations (‘fleshy macroalgae’) usually only 
appear when there are not many grazing herbivorous fish around. These formations, once 
developed, may make the area difficult to inhabit for such fish. As a result, habitat provision for 
these fish and algal formations may often be largely incompatible (Bellwood et al., 2004). In a 
broader sense, taking the coral ecosystem function definition from Bellwood et al. (2019), any 
movement of matter or energy in an ecosystem is going to preclude other such movements. 
Functions, structures and compositions may also be characterised with various degrees of 
abstraction. Functions may vary from providing habitats for a specific endemic reef fish to simply 
sustaining nearby human life. Composition may be detailed at a fine-grained scale, e.g. proportions 
of different coral species, or a coarser one, e.g. relative proportions of coral (regardless of species) 
to algae. Even a baseline focused on one kind of characteristic, such as ecosystem function or 
composition, will therefore involve many choices  
Constructing and employing different baselines will alter how systems such as algal reefs are 
characterised. Focusing on macroalgal formations, for example, will make algal reefs seem less (or 
not) degraded. Focusing on sea urchins may make algal reefs seem degraded in a different way. 
Focusing on some ecosystem functions, e.g. habitat provision for tropical fish, may make the reef 
seem more degraded than if other species, such as hardier invertebrates (which survive in coral and 
algal systems), are focused on. Likewise, focusing on groups of functionally equivalent species 
(rather than individual species) will allow for different characterisations, as will different timescales.  
So far, I have taken a textbook case of degradation, highlighted the specific baseline employed by 
this case, and argued that other baselines are conceivable, i.e. algal reefs are not necessarily 
degraded. By prioritising different entities, characteristics, or timescales, it is possible to produce 
contradictory and mutually exclusive descriptions of the same processes, meaning this is not simply 
a problem of vagueness, but one of underdetermination: the facts of a case simply are not enough 
to usefully characterise the phenomena. I now examine actual arguments made for the use of 
 
impact elements of a system have had in such systems in the past (etiological accounts, e.g. Millikan, 1989); 
the contribution they have to some higher-level capacity now (causal role functions e.g. Cummins, 1975); what 
a thing regularly does (activity functions e.g. Love, 2007). There are also debates about what types of functions 
can be assigned to parts of ecosystems (e.g. Lean, 2020) which I ignore here, as they do not affect the 
arguments of this paper significantly. The key point is that a variety of functions can be ascribed in any one 
case, and these can be used to construct different baselines. Importantly, functions need not ground the 
normativity of baselines themselves, because the normativity is added by the process of including them in a 
baseline. 




alternative baselines in assessing algal reefs. The ways these arguments are made will help reveal 
the specific role value plays in the production of non-arbitrary baselines. 
4.3 The debate over algal reefs: degraded or different?  
Some reef scientists have argued against the view that algal reefs should typically be seen as 
degraded (Bruno et al., 2014; Vroom, 2011; Howe, 1912). In doing so, they advocate for employing 
different baselines when assessing reefs and changes to them. I present three of these arguments 
here. In the next section I refer back to these to show how they invoke value and the consequences 
of this for the labels regeneration and degradation.  
The first point often made by algae advocates (which I refer to as argument 1) is that coral and algal-
dominated states represent diverse classes of ecosystem with varying levels of biodiversity and 
complexity (Fulton et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2014). It can sometimes be hard to distinguish 
between algal and coral dominance, given the imprecise nature of the notions, and within many 
reefs, including coral-dominated ones, the role of algae is underappreciated (Vroom, 2011; Fulton et 
al., 2019; Howe, 1912). Part of this may be due to coral species being more well-recognised and 
charismatic, with algae suffering from a ‘charisma gap’, i.e. having less charm or appeal than coral 
(Unsworth et al., 2019; Duarte et al., 2008). Here, focus on coral (as a more charismatic marine 
organism) can distract from other marine organisms such as algae.  
The second argument (argument 2) in favour of different baselines is that algal reefs may support a 
variety of organisms, including carnivorous and herbivorous fish, invertebrates and macroalgae of 
varying complexity. They may also support ecosystem services, such as food or biofuel production. 
Algal and coral reefs may have some features in common, such as supporting some fish or 
invertebrates of the same type, providing habitats for some of the same organisms, and offering 
some of the same ecosystem services to humans, such as income provision or production of fish. 
Both sets of ecosystems form important parts of the wider marine seascape. They are both often 
important ecosystems in their own right, supporting a range of organisms and ecological functions 
(Fulton et al., 2019; Woodhead et al., 2019; Vroom, 2011).  
Finally (argument 3) it is also argued that not all algal reefs are produced by anthropogenic causes 
(Vroom, 2011; Fulton et al., 2019). Appeals to pre-human conditions as baselines may therefore not 
always be sufficient to justify considering algal reefs as degraded, especially as in many cases algal-
dominated is assumed to be synonymous with degraded without regard to the actual origin of the 




system (Roth et al., 2018; Rachmilovitz and Rinkevich, 2017; Vroom et al., 2006)17. An interesting 
complicating factor here is that reefs which have more large predators (for example because fewer 
have been killed by fishing) may also have higher proportions of algae. This is because more large 
predators means fewer herbivorous fish, so less grazing, and more algae (Bruno et al., 2014). This 
suggests that some pre-human-disturbance reefs may have had higher proportions of algae present 
than some coral-dominated reefs today18.  
Even in a textbook case of degradation, different baselines are sometimes employed. By focusing 
more on algae, or on other entities and characteristics associated with algal reefs, baselines are 
constructed which do not characterise many algal reefs as degraded, or else characterise them as 
less degraded. Indeed, given the right baseline, movement of a coral reef towards an algal state 
could be considered regenerative. 
4.4 Anything goes? 
So far then, looking at characterisations of algal reefs has seemed to suggest that facts alone can’t 
tell us which baselines to employ, meaning that something more than the facts about changes to a 
reef is needed to usefully apply the labels degradation or regeneration. Even in seemingly obvious 
cases of degradation, multiple baselines are discernible, allowing for multiple characterisations, i.e. 
any case could be described as regenerative or degradative simply by employing a different baseline. 
Focusing on some entities and ignoring others can produce diametrically opposed characterisations 
of the same phenomena. And yet, some baselines are rightly considered more legitimate than 
others. Looking at how value is involved in baseline construction helps explain this.  
5. Baselines and value  
How can regeneration and degradation be distinguished if even in textbook cases of degradation, 
multiple distinct baselines can be employed? How can disagreement over what counts as 
degradation and regeneration be accounted for? Why are algal reefs typically, but not always, 
considered degraded? My solution to these questions is linked to the value attributed to reef 
configurations. Much has been written about the influence of values on scientific concepts and 
practices (Kincaid, Dupré and Wylie, 2007; Lee and Helgesson, 2020). As such, a role for value here 
 
17 It is because of this that we cannot simply say that only algal reefs which were once coral reefs are 
degraded, as often algal reefs are labelled degraded without reference to their history (Vroom et al., 2006). 
18 This is an interesting case of shifting baselines, given that it has previously been suggested that newer 
shifted baselines make greater algal cover seem healthier than older baselines do (Braverman, 2020). The 
example here suggests that whilst in the short term, coral scientists may have become more accepting of 
higher algal compositions, in the long term, they may have become less accepting of them. Shifting baselines 
may then operate in opposite directions at different temporal scales. 




might seem obvious to philosophers well-versed in these areas. There is an interesting tension in this 
example though. Coral science is filled with appeals to the many ways coral reefs may be valuable to 
different actors. But at the same time, baselines are often treated as given and value-free, for 
example: ‘The pristine or natural state of a population or community is called the baseline in 
conservation biology, and it serves as a guide for setting conservation and restoration targets’ 
(Bruno et al., 2014, p.24). Even when baselines are the focus of discussion, the contingency of our 
view of nature recognised, and the value of a specific baseline is emphasised, debate focuses on 
simply pushing the timescale of the baseline back further to the true ‘pristine’ baseline (Jackson, 
2001). As such, there is often little explicit recognition of value-ladenness in the familiar sense. 
Squaring this tension not only helps in understanding what work the notions of regeneration, 
degradation and baselines are doing, but also points to an underappreciated role for value in 
science. The value highlighted in these cases is the considerable and varied forms of value attributed 
to coral reefs, including affective (Braverman, 2018), economic (Costanza et al., 2014) and ecological 
(Knowlton, 2001) forms, to name just a few. The connection between discussions of values in 
science and the value of coral reefs may not immediately seem obvious. I will show here that despite 
being attached to the entities being described, these forms of value operate like other notions of 
values in science, in this case shaping concept formation and characterisation of evidence. 
Given the extensive philosophical writing on value, I have something like the definition employed by 
Leonelli (2016) in mind when I use the term here: value as the mode and intensity of attention and 
care paid by some actor towards something, along with the motivations underlying this (Leonelli, 
2016, p.63). I focus largely on anthropocentric forms, albeit allowing for vicarious valuation, i.e. 
humans valuing something an organism depends upon because we value the organism itself19. By 
showing how value and baselines interact, as well as the implications of this, I hope to make sense of 
the algal case specifically and suggest some lessons for understanding regeneration generally.  
5.1 Value drives baseline choice 
To understand how reef value impacts baselines, and therefore judgements based on these, it is 
useful to look at the role played by value in arguments for using different baselines in the algal reef 
case. I focus here on arguments 1-3 outlined in section 4.3. Importantly, I am not evaluating the 
merits of the arguments or values presented, but simply noting the relations between them. When 
observers describe regeneration or degradation, they focus on and include valued aspects of coral 
systems in their baselines. Other aspects are ignored. The kinds of characteristics included will also 
 
19 I do not get into debates over biocentric/anthropocentric accounts of value. Both fit with the arguments I 
present. 




make a big difference to what is permitted under the rubric of regeneration (I return to this in the 
next section). 
Argument 1 had two key parts: that algal and coral systems are broad classes of systems which can 
be difficult to distinguish, and that algae play an under-appreciated role in many such systems. The 
claim is that algae should be given more precedence in baselines when assessing changes to reefs 
(Vroom, 2011; Howe, 1912). There is a claim about value underlying this: the low affective value of 
algae compared to coral has led to it being unduly ignored in baseline construction. This 
phenomenon, which has been termed the ‘charisma gap’, has been observed in other marine 
ecosystems too, whereby less charismatic ecosystems or organisms are afforded less resources for 
research and intervention, despite performing equally valuable ecological and economic roles 
(Unsworth et al., 2019; Duarte et al., 2008). This may be driven in part by the value attributions of 
the general population, in that popular sentiments may drive research funding and attention (Duarte 
et al., 2008). As such, argument 1 shows a role for affective value here in driving inclusion of specific 
entities and characteristics into baselines, with a focus on species composition. 
Argument 2 stresses the vital roles played by both algal and coral reefs in ecological and economic 
systems. This argument amounts to the claim that algae have greater than recognised ecological and 
economic value. Attempts to shift the baselines used in assessing algal reefs have, in this case, been 
premised on claims that algae perform many important ecological and economic roles, such as 
providing habitats for sets of fish and invertebrates, supporting biodiversity and other ecosystems 
across the seascape, and providing opportunities for tourism and income provision20 (Fulton et al., 
2019). It is recognised that not all algal-dominated reefs will provide significant ecological and 
economic value, but still argued that many do, and so baselines should take more account of this. 
Here, appeals to value are once again being used to justify construction and deployment of different 
baselines, with a focus on the economic and ecological functions of the system. 
A final appeal to value is visible in argument 3. Here, the claim is that not all algal reefs are 
anthropogenic, and that pre-human reefs may have had higher proportions of algae than is allowed 
for in baselines today. This is chiefly because humans have altered ecosystem dynamics through 
killing large predators, which has allowed herbivore numbers to increase, and therefore has reduced 
algal cover (Bruno et al., 2014; Vroom et al., 2006). The appeal here is to the value of algae as a part 
of a non-human-disturbed ecosystem. In this case then, the value being appealed to is related to 
 
20 Note that by invoking the wider seascape, the spatial scale of the baseline may have also been changed 
(again, because of the ecological value of reefs on this broader spatial scale).  




naturalness, wilderness, or independence from human influence21. Again, these claims about the 
value of algal reefs are used to alter the legitimacy of including more algal elements in baselines, and 
thereby reappraise the status of reefs with more algae, reducing the extent to which they are seen 
as degraded (in some cases completely). This example again focuses on the species composition of 
the reef, i.e. the relative coral/algae proportions, rather than things like ecosystem services or 
functions. The truth or falsity of each of these claims about value is largely irrelevant for 
understanding regeneration and degradation here: what matters is that arguments for different 
baselines are accompanied by claims about the value of the things included in them. 
As these arguments show, the perceived value of the aspects of the system drives their inclusion 
into or exclusion from the baseline. Whilst it has been recognised that value may drive 
preoccupation with different timescales (Campbell et al., 2009), there are further ways that 
baselines can vary, even those on the same timescale: they must also include a set of characteristics. 
This is visible in the algal domination example, where value attributions are linked to a focus on 
certain kinds of characteristic. The argument that affective value prevents proper consideration of 
algae focuses on inclusion of specific entities (coral and algae) into employed baselines, i.e. 
producing a baseline focused on species composition. The arguments about ecological and economic 
value are more about a set of reef system functions and services22, which reduces focus on specific 
entities such as species. I discuss some of the consequences of this in the final section. Finally, the 
appeal to the value of non-anthropogenic ecosystems, as in the claim that pre-human ecosystems 
would have had more algae than supposed, involves an appeal to species composition again: it 
focuses on the entities present and their historical relations to humans and the ecosystem23. 
A range of other constraints will operate on the construction of baselines too, for example legal or 
epistemic ones (Hirsch, 2020). Inclusion of something in a baseline, however, and employment of 
that baseline to judge changes to a system, is in part predicated on the value of some aspects of the 
system in question. This explains why some baselines are employed more frequently than others, 
and hence why algal domination is usually, but not always, seen as degradation. Broadly speaking, 
most observers see changes from coral to algal states as sacrificing more valuable aspects than are 
gained: i.e. the regenerative processes are trivial, and the degradative ones significant. The facts 
about some ecosystem then will not be enough to characterise it as degraded or regenerated, as 
 
21 An explicit example of an appeal to this kind of value is given by Katz (2007) 
22 Although clearly individual entities can have economic and ecological value too, although these were not 
focused on in this example. Cases such as functions and services can be controversial because of the scope for 
novelty they can allow (explored in the next section).  
23 This may be an appeal to ecological or biological integrity, which is often appealed to in conservation 
(Callicott, Crowder and Mumford, 1999). 




some judgement of the value of the entities present in the system will be necessary to choose one 
perspective over another. Regeneration and degradation amount to movement of a system towards 
or away from some baseline, with the baseline focused on the valuable aspects of the system being 
observed. This makes any process regenerative (degradative) if it restores (impedes) some valued 
aspect of a system. Far from being an example of undue and pernicious direct influence of non-
epistemic value on scientific concept formation, as warned against in e.g. Douglas (2016) and 
Vellend (2019), here value is required to make concepts useful, enhancing rather than undermining 
their use in scientific descriptions.  
5.2 Arbitrariness and value  
Recognising that many different, and some mutually exclusive, baselines may be employed in any 
case seems to threaten to make notions of regeneration and degradation arbitrary24. Suggesting that 
they are value-laden, and therefore not entirely empirical concepts, seems to further threaten this. 
Even in the relatively simple (compared to novel ecosystem cases) case of algal dominance, different 
value attributions lead to different characterisations of the same process.  
However, by looking at the way alternative baselines are argued for, it becomes clearer that the 
value-laden aspects of the concepts save them from arbitrary application. To argue for the 
construction and employment of different baselines, advocates also argued for the value of these 
baselines. This was not a case of people simply asserting a value preference for a different baseline 
and ignoring the facts of the case. Instead, baselines act as an area of interesting overlap between 
value and fact, and between measurement and judgement. As with thick concepts (Putnam, 2002) 
and mixed claims (Alexandrova, 2018), regeneration and degradation claims involve a combination 
of value and fact, and not in a way that makes them simply undisputable assertions of personal 
preferences. Here then, the role for value is in gatekeeping what can be reasonably included in a 
baseline, simultaneously making the baseline relevant to those employing it. Baselines must be 
justified through arguments about the forms of value they recognise, be that related to affectivity, 
biodiversity, wilderness, ecosystem functions or economics. Both the facts about an ecological 
process (how do characteristics change) and an understanding of what is valuable about the 
ecosystem in question (which of these characteristics matter) are required in order describe 
 
24 Note that the problem here is not so much that baselines are constructed, given that construction (or social 
construction) does not necessarily threaten the existential status of something, or prevent it from having 
significant impact on other aspects of the world (see, for example, Hacking (2003)). The problem here is that 
many very different baselines can be constructed for a single case. Without recourse to value, there will be no 
way to adjudicate between them, rendering the descriptions built on top of them (regeneration, degradation) 
entirely contingent upon arbitrarily employed baselines.  




something as regeneration or degradation. The concepts are thereby only arbitrary if value is 
excluded from the scientific process.  
The disagreement over the extent to which algal domination is an indicator of degradation comes 
down, in part, to how people value aspects of living systems. This does not mean that such 
disagreements are therefore intractable. The philosophy of medicine is instructive here: accounts of 
disease which highlight a role for value are sometimes charged with pernicious relativism about 
what counts as a disease, i.e. they make the concept of disease arbitrary, or make all applications of 
it equally legitimate, there being no way to dispute them. Such accounts are only perniciously 
relativist if a very specific metaphysical position is taken on value: that value judgements cannot be 
reasonably debated (Glackin, 2019). In most contexts, such a position on value is not usually taken, 
so in the same way as we can confidently say slavery is wrong (which plainly involves both value 
judgements and facts), we can say that anthropogenic murky green reefs with little complexity or 
diversity are degraded25.  
It is because of value judgements that, generally speaking, algal domination is seen as degradation. 
In many cases, what people value will line up, and so cases will be described similarly (Hobbs, 
2016)26. This is obvious if we push the case of algal domination even further: in cases of clearly 
anthropogenic and very low complexity algal reefs, which usually have very low biodiversity too, 
even advocates of more algae-sympathetic baselines will employ the language of degradation 
(Fulton et al., 2019; Vroom et al., 2006). The value of the entities being described ensures the labels 
regeneration and degradation are useful and non-arbitrary, rather than undermining them27. Where 
there are disagreements over which types of value are legitimate bases for constructing baselines, 
debate will be more intractable. Understanding the relations between baselines, value and 
regeneration can help with such disagreements. I address this now, in the final section, along with 
some of the other implications of this view.  
 
25 Whilst regeneration and degradation claims are relative to value, there are still absolutist and relativist 
positions on value which could be taken here, both of which will allow for value-laden, non-arbitrary and 
useful notions of regeneration and degradation. Versions of both may allow for some descriptions to be much 
more reasonable or legitimate than others. Defenders of relativism would argue that a relativist account only 
implies there is no neutral perspective from which different baselines can be absolutely ranked (e.g. Kusch, 
2020; Veigl, 2020). This still allows for baselines to be more legitimate than one another, to be reasonably 
debated, and for cases to yield widespread agreement. The key difference is whether statements about 
degradation/regeneration are true objectively (absolutism) or intersubjectively (relativism).  
26 Note that even if value judgements do line up, factual disagreements may still operate. There are also other 
influences on baselines, as is explored in Ureta, Lekan and von Hardenberg (2020). Recognising the role for 
value in baselines can help facilitate discussion (explored in section 6). 
27 By useful here I do not necessarily mean usefulness for intervening in the world. Often the labels 
degradation/regeneration are used without any plan to intervene. They may simply be useful for 
understanding the nature of the changes to a system. 





People value reefs, and that value plays a role in characterising changes to reefs as regenerative or 
degradative. Here I explore the implications of this view, for understanding conservation and 
regeneration generally, novel ecosystems specifically, and for mediating disputes.   
6.1 Pristinity, value and the social sciences 
The arguments here are that baselines (often tacitly) encode the value judgements underlying 
descriptions of changes to ecosystems (for a similar approach to biodiversity as encoding values, see 
Sarkar (2019)). Value drives inclusion of different timescales, entities and characteristics into 
baselines. A result of this is that even those baselines which favour a pre-human ‘natural’ or 
‘pristine’ ecosystem state are still choosing timescales, entities and characteristics, driven by value 
considerations. This makes sense of the tension visible in the coral science literature between 
looking for correct baselines, and between recognising that different configurations of coral systems 
have benefits and costs for different organisms. Often, pristine baselines are presented as not only 
the correct baseline, but also hugely valuable states. See, for example, Jackson (2001), who talks 
about how much richer a truly pristine reef would seem to us today (p.5416). On my account, it is 
because of the value of such ecosystemic arrangements that we often consider them the correct 
baseline to aim for, rather than these baselines being the correct ones and therefore valuable, or it 
simply being a coincidence that baselines depict valuable states of affairs.  
That value underlies these descriptions (and any attendant interventions) makes it more important 
that social scientists engage with attempts at regeneration in systems with multiple stakeholders, as 
with coral ecosystems. The forms of value attributed to reefs are regularly examined in economic, 
ecological and social sciences, or combinations thereof (see, for example, Moberg and Folke (1999) 
or Braverman (2018))28. By shaping baselines and scientific concept formation, these forms of value 
become interesting in a new sense for those engaged in describing/inducing changes to ecosystems 
(coral scientists, ecologists, conservationists) and those interested in understanding these practices 
(philosophers and social scientists of science). In order to understand coral regeneration, we need to 
understand the value attributions different groups bring to the table when evaluating changes to 
coral reefs. This is in line with attempts to produce combined socio-ecological models of coral 
ecosystems (Aswani et al., 2015; Hughes et al., 2017). In the context of coral science, the implication 
is that understanding the value judgements of coral scientists themselves (as well as other 
 
28 Note that this is only one of many possible roles for value: I have only covered the value of the entities being 
described, rather than more traditional notions of epistemic/non-epistemic value (discussed in section 2, and 
not the focus of this paper). 




stakeholders) is important, given that they have influence over descriptions of and responses to 
changes to reefs29.  
6.2 Perspective and life-worlds 
The need for value in describing the sorts of changes discussed here is in part due to the multiple 
sets of interests (human and otherwise) involved in systems like coral reefs. To describe changes 
relevantly and usefully we must weigh in on the side of some sets of interests and not others. 
Describing or inducing regeneration and degradation is always done from a perspective, and the 
same cases may look very different from other perspectives (Hobbs, 2016). Just as the baselines 
used to evaluate a forest will be constructed differently for a lumberjack, bird enthusiast, naturist, or 
berry forager, so they will also be constructed differently when they are considered with different 
humans or other organisms in mind. Organisms have different life-worlds, and the same setting will 
be significant for them in different ways (Uexkull, 2010)30. Corals, for example, are both organisms 
themselves and habitats for many other organisms (Rinkevich, 2005). Baselines may include aspects 
relevant for some habitats and not others and impact different habitats and organisms in opposing 
ways. Regeneration favouring the algae found in low-complexity reefs is likely to be degradation for 
most other organisms. The same system can be regenerated in multiple senses, so systems can’t be 
simply regenerated without taking a perspective on them: aspects of them must be picked and 
prioritised. Whilst it has been suggested that attributing value to the objects of study in ecology can 
have undue and negative influence on the scientific process (Vellend, 2019) (something I do not 
deny here), I have argued that such value must also necessarily play a role for concepts like 
regeneration and degradation to be useful and non-arbitrary. Baselines, then, operate as claims 
about the value of certain perspectives. Being explicit about what baselines contain can help clarify 
whether observers are operating from the same perspective and prioritising the same things.  
6.3 Regeneration and novelty 
That regeneration is perspectival helps with the problem mentioned at the start: a general account 
of regeneration must explain why a huge range of cases have been described as regenerative, or else 
why some of them are not genuine instances of regeneration. This is made trickier by the emergence 
of novelty in some cases. Examples of processes labelled regenerative include: homeostasis, 
organism development, reproduction, growth of extra heads, replacement of organism parts with 
different ones, wound repair, forest regrowth after fire, reshaping of landscapes after introduction 
 
29 Insights from areas such as behavioural economics may be useful here, as is noted by Vellend (2019) in 
relation to ecology generally. 
30 With thanks to Sophie Gerber for suggesting the connection with Uexkull and life-worlds 




of wolves, and replacement of limbs with prosthetics (Morgan, 1901; Johnstone et al., 2016; 
Monbiot, 2013; Stark, 2018). The processes in this list introduce novelty to varying degrees.  
On the account I have presented here, all of these processes may be considered regenerative. To be 
regenerative, a process must simply restore some valued aspect of the system in question, given 
that this aspect is included in a baseline. Different baselines may take different timescales and 
characteristics or entities as their focus, and so allow for very different processes to amount to 
regeneration. Depending on what is included in the baseline this may allow for a lot of novelty to be 
introduced. In the case of a damaged embryo developing into a healthy organism (Morgan, 1901), 
the organism as a temporally extended entity is being focused on, and it is this which is restored. In 
the case of organisms growing extra heads (Lenhoff and Lenhoff, 1991), the heads themselves are 
focused on, and it is functioning heads (rather than the pre-disturbance state of the whole organism) 
which are restored. Focusing on heads and their functioning, rather than the whole organism, may 
be driven by the scientific value attributed to such processes, as it was in some of the earliest animal 
regeneration experiments (Lenhoff and Lenhoff, 1991). There is a connection with accounts of self-
renewal in cells here. Only a certain set of characteristics will be measured in experimental setups 
observing cell self-renewal. As long as those characteristics being focused on are restored, changes 
in other characteristics, or the appearance of new characteristics, will not prevent a case being 
considered self-renewal (Fagan, 2013, p.22). However, if other characteristics are focused on, a case 
of self-renewal may be reappraised. Cases of regeneration and degradation may similarly be 
reappraised depending on which characteristics the observer pays attention to and cares about (i.e. 
which characteristics they value). Strictly speaking, systems are always different once regenerated, 
and although the degree of difference can vary greatly, their valued characteristics are the same 
(unless partially regenerated, in which case they are at least closer to how they were before 
requiring regeneration31).  
That different contexts will enable many different processes to be described as regeneration is a 
positive feature of this account. By including different timescales, entities or characteristics in a 
baseline, for example because of the scientific value of doing so, parallels between processes 
commonly considered regenerative and other process, such as those considered damaging, may be 
exposed and explored. Cancer, for example, is noted to have similarities with other regenerative 
processes (Schäfer and Werner, 2008). Being able to view such phenomena in a different light may 
 
31 Regeneration may be partial in two senses: 1. It may not move all the way towards the chosen baseline; 2. 
Movement towards a baseline will mean movement away from other baselines (i.e. not everything is 
restored). I have argued here that all regeneration is partial in this second sense. 




help expose fruitful differences and similarities between them and more intuitive cases of 
regeneration32.  
6.4 Novel ecosystems, ecosystem services and future-oriented baselines 
This understanding of baselines, value and regeneration helps explain the controversy surrounding 
novel ecosystems and ecosystem services. Debate surrounds the status of novel ecosystems, which 
differ significantly from past ecosystems yet are not necessarily degraded (Hobbs, Higgs and Harris, 
2009). I have argued that changes can introduce any amount of novelty and still reasonably be 
considered regenerative as long as they restore some valued characteristics. Debate over novel 
ecosystems may be caused by two issues then: First, that within a single baseline, some 
characteristics are restored and others impeded33. Second, that there are multiple reasonable 
evaluative standpoints available to construct baselines from, and so several legitimate baselines.  
The problem of multiple reasonable evaluative standpoints being available is crystalised in 
controversy over ecosystem services. Often, the ecosystem service framework is charged with 
instrumentalising living things, treating nature as primarily valuable for its roles in serving human 
wellbeing (Schröter et al., 2014). A feature of baselines I have presented here is at the root of this: 
even on the same timescale, they may focus on different kinds of characteristic. Ecosystem services, 
along with the functional approach to ecology often associated with novel ecosystems (e.g. 
Bellwood et al., 2004; Hobbs, Higgs and Harris, 2009), allow for a focus on the activities of an 
ecosystem rather than a concern for specific entities or species compositions. Such activities may, if 
desired, be characterised in very abstract ways, such as simply supporting a wide range of living 
things, or specifically supporting human wellbeing. By focusing on such characteristics, radical 
changes in other variables such as species composition can be described as regenerative. Organisms 
fulfilling similar roles from an anthropocentric instrumental perspective may be able to replace one 
another without this being evaluated negatively. Even in less anthropocentric guises, organisms may 
be grouped by their ecological functions and treated as fungible if they perform the same ones 
 
32 With thanks to Lucie Laplane for pointing this out. For a different, coral-specific, example, bleaching can be 
recharacterized as a regenerative process in the right context and with the right baseline. Investigations into 
bleaching have sometimes treated it as an adaptive phenomenon which may help the coral readjust its 
resident microbes to better suit changing environmental conditions (Obura, 2009). As such, bleached states 
may be included in the dynamic baseline aimed at for regeneration, if a degree of occasional bleaching is 
thought to be normal or healthy for coral. Treating it as such may help in understanding and preventing 
excessive bleaching, or else harnessing it to regenerate coral (something which is being trialled (Buerger et al., 
2020)). 
33 Introduction of new valuable characteristics, without impeding or restoring others, may also complicate this. 
In the language of medicine, this would be an enhancement rather than a treatment, with the difference 
between these coming down to how the baseline state is conceived (i.e. whether the improvement is a 
movement towards the baseline or not). The distinction between these can therefore be contentious (Juengst 
and Moseley, 2019).   




(Bellwood et al., 2004). For those with other perspectives on the value of the living system in 
question, such as those who consider a species intrinsically valuable, sacrificing some species and 
allowing them to be replaced by others in the name of regeneration will seem absurd. Intrinsically 
valuing a species may result in its inclusion in a baseline, meaning it is not fungible at all, and cannot 
be lost without moving away from the baseline (Maguire and Justus, 2008). Likewise, for those that 
value specific historical configurations (sometimes termed ecological or biological integrity (Callicott, 
Crowder and Mumford, 1999)), baselines which allow for that to be compromised in the service of 
other valued aspects, such as ecosystem functioning or biodiversity, will seem unacceptable.  
This also helps make sense of the notion of forward-looking baselines, suggested as a solution to our 
inability to return to pristine states (Braverman, 2020). How can we regenerate an ecosystem back 
to something it never was? By relaxing a focus on historical species and their compositions, baselines 
can nevertheless include some element of the past (e.g. ecosystem functioning) but also represent 
radical change from it. Even future-oriented baselines, then, involve return to a historical state, just 
in a more abstract way. For many people, in cases where a return to a specific composition is not 
possible, such forward-looking baselines may seem a feasible or desirable way that regeneration can 
still be carried out. Conversely, a more concrete focus on historical species composition may 
explicitly deny a place for humans, and prevent any environment with humans in it from being 
considered regenerated. Debates over such cases will come down to how observers value human-
influenced nature, and in part whether human activity is seen as disturbing that value or compatible 
with it34 (Callicott, Crowder and Mumford, 1999). Depending on how nature is valued then, and 
which kinds of characteristic are included in baselines, it is possible to allow for regeneration to take 
place even when species or structures irreversibly disappear, or where the end-state includes heavy 
human influence35.  
6.5 What counts as regeneration? Shifts, disagreements and mediation  
On this account, what counts as regeneration will come down to which timescales, entities and 
characteristics are valued and prioritised, something which cannot be decided simply by observing 
the regenerating system. Whilst some people may consider coral to algal shifts as degradation, 
 
34 This, may, in part, have theological roots (Robbins and Moore, 2013). These views are reflected in different 
ecological practices, such as treating humans as disturbing conditions (i.e. excluding them from baselines, or 
not building them into models) or treating them as normal parts of the ecosystem (Inkpen, 2017) 
35 Note that in the extreme, this account of baselines could accommodate a fully artificial reef, designed and 
manufactured for e.g. economic benefit and populated with charismatic reef species. Baselines could be 
constructed for this with purely anthropocentric and economic motives, and so the reef could be legitimately 
described as regenerating with only these considerations in mind. The point of this example is that baselines 
need not only be applied to non-manmade systems, and may be useful in more artificial cases (e.g. urban 
ecology). With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. 




others may disagree. Similarly, shifts between dominance of different types and arrangements of 
coral species, or algal species (i.e. shifts within rather than between coral or algal reefs), may also be 
seen as degradative or regenerative. Decisions must be made about which sacrifices are acceptable 
and which characteristics are to be attended to and cared about. These are decisions about what to 
value, and how to rank various forms of value, and people may disagree or change their minds over 
these decisions.  
Shifts in the way aspects of living systems are attended to and cared about will produce shifts in 
what is described as regeneration or degradation. As shown earlier, some reef scientists have argued 
that the value of reefs dominated by algae is underappreciated (Vroom, 2011; Fulton et al., 2019; 
Howe, 1912). Algal reefs, supporters claim, have important ecosystemic functions for a variety of 
organisms, including humans (Vroom, 2011; Fulton et al., 2019; Howe, 1912). A consequence of this 
underappreciation is that the vulnerability of certain types of algal reef, particularly those which are 
complex and support greater biodiversity, is also underappreciated (Fulton et al., 2019; Vroom, 
2011). For example, some species of algae, including those essential for much coral-reef building, 
have skeletons more susceptible to damage from ocean acidification than coral skeletons (Vroom, 
2011). Similarly, more complex algal reefs may be pushed by disturbances into less complex and less 
diverse states (Fulton et al., 2019). Recognising these threats may drive shifts in targets for 
regeneration. In the future, complex and diverse algal reefs may become less prevalent, and 
regeneration of degraded algal reefs (or other forms of reef) back into their former non-degraded 
algal states may be necessary. This is simply an indication that when the value attributed to an 
ecosystem state shifts - e.g. because it becomes less prevalent, or its features better appreciated - it 
can become a target for regeneration attempts.  
Where there is contention over the description of changes to an ecosystem, recognising baselines as 
value-driven can help. Baselines represent an arena where scientific measurement and value 
judgements interact36 producing mixed descriptions (Alexandrova, 2018). Making the value aspects 
of regeneration and degradation claims explicit is both important and difficult. It is important 
because debates over degradation and regeneration may not be resolvable in arguments which only 
consider facts. Not only this, but when left unexamined, value-judgements represent a potential 
source of systematic bias37. It is difficult because many different forms and sources of value may 
 
36 This is akin to accounts of biodiversity as a meeting place for scientific measurement and value judgements 
(Sarkar, 2019). 
37 As in cases such as implicit judgements about the value of non-native species skewing the results of 
ecological studies in under-appreciated ways (Vellend, 2019). I have argued here that in a sense bias is 
necessary, but this does not mean it should go unexamined. 




operate simultaneously, influencing choices during baseline construction in subtle and complex 
ways.  
By making the timescale, entities and characteristics of the baseline employed in a given description 
explicit, justifications for including these in the baseline will also typically be made explicit too. Just 
as with the algal case, elements of baselines will often come packaged with reasons why we should 
care about them, i.e. the value judgements supporting them. By doing so, disputes may be mediated 
more effectively, and the source of disagreement located clearly. In the algal reef case, for example, 
a lack of clarity about baselines hides several different disagreements. Some arguments are about 
the potential economic value algal reefs could provide for local populations, such as through 
providing a farm for biofuels. By making clear that the baseline in evaluating reefs is in this case 
about functions which perform economic roles, it becomes clearer that for some people, this debate 
is resolved by answering a purely factual question: can this algal reef support local incomes to the 
same degree as a coral one? However, for others who prioritise different forms of value, such as the 
intrinsic ecological value of coral reefs, this debate will be harder to resolve.  
Other arguments in the algal case focus on wilderness value of undisturbed reefs. Again, in this case, 
by making baselines explicit, it is more obvious that some disagreements may be factual, and hence 
resolvable by simply asking: how much algae was there on some reef at some specific place and 
time? For those focused on other forms of value, the answer to this question may be less relevant, 
and so the debate more intractable. By not making baselines explicit, several debates are had at 
once (e.g. about both the economic and historic status of reefs) and across value contexts, making 
what is actually at stake unclear. Advocates of both algae-sympathetic and other baselines may be in 
agreement about the economic, ecological and historical value of some states, but as long as 
baselines remain unclear, and which forms of value are being appealed to left only implicit, these 
agreements will remain hidden. Making the baselines explicit, and so teasing out the values 
underlying them, allows for opportunities for reconciliation to be spotted. Once the epistemological, 
ontological and value commitments of different stakeholders are made clearer, partial overlaps can 
be looked for, and even in places where there are no overlaps, different ontologies and value 
schemes can be combined in ways that produce fruitful outcomes for a range of stakeholders 
(Ludwig and El-Hani, 2020). Such mediation is particularly important given the increasing calls for 
active methods to save coral reefs, which feature more direct interventions in coral biology and 
ecology, and so are likely to introduce more novelty (Anthony et al., 2017).  





I set out here to distinguish regeneration from degradation in the context of constructed baselines, 
and to explain how the value of the systems being baselined influences the construction of these 
concepts. First, I suggested that baselines consist of an undegraded ecosystem state, a set of 
characteristics and entities representative of this state, and a spatiotemporal scale. Regeneration 
and degradation are movements towards or away from the baseline, which depicts how the system 
ought to behave. I then showed that even in textbook cases of degradation, such as algal dominance 
of coral reefs, many baselines are available, some of which are very different. By looking at how 
advocates of different baselines presented their arguments, I argued we can see a role for the value 
of aspects of the system being described, in driving which entities/characteristics and timescales are 
included, and in making some baselines more reasonable or legitimate. This explains why algal 
domination of coral reefs is typically, but not always, seen as degradation: because in many 
contexts, the elements lost are cared about more than those restored or maintained. In other value 
contexts however, this need not necessarily be the case. Rather than simply negatively skewing 
research, the value of the ecosystem in question is a necessary part of baselining and describing 
changes to it. More broadly, this shows that the value of objects of scientific study may influence 
their own characterisation within science, in addition to values (as in social or personal ideals) 
performing this role. The account of regeneration I have presented explains why very diverse 
processes, including those that introduce significant novelty, have all been described as 
regenerative: because they employ different baselines, but all involve restoration of some valued 
characteristics relative to these. Value commitments are encoded in baselines, driving 
disagreements over the status of some processes, but making baselines an opportune tool for 
exposing such value commitments, thereby clarifying disputes. Value-laden baselines are fruitfully 
perspectival, allowing us to understand regeneration and degradation in the context of what matters 
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